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In this paper, we construct and estimate a (semi-) structural model, so as to uncover the fraction
of hidden unemployment in the Disability Insurance (DI) enrolment rate. For this purpose, we
use longitudinal administrative data of Dutch employers for 1994-2003. We ﬁnd the (average)
fraction of hidden unemployment in DI enrolment to amount to about 11%. This corresponds to
2.6% of the ‘true’ unemployment insurance (UI) enrolment rate of employers. Over the years,
we observe a strong decrease in this fraction, from 5.4% in 1995, to 0.7% in 2003. In addition,
our estimates suggest that most of correlation that is observed between the UI and DI enrolment
rates can be explained by substitution effects, and not by ‘true’ correlation between the schemes
that is exogenous to the ﬁrm. In the model, the fraction of hidden unemployment in the DI
scheme is (over-)identiﬁed from various restrictions imposed by the data. First, identiﬁcation
follows from exclusion restrictions obtained from the coefﬁcient estimates of variables that are
assumed to inﬂuence the UI enrolment rate only. For this purpose, we use information on the
wage distribution of workers employed at the ﬁrms in our sample, and sectoral growth rates.
Second, identiﬁcation of substitution effects follows from the observed correlation between both
enrolment rates.
Keywords: Firm behaviour (D21), social security (H55), disability (I12), employment
determination (J2).
Abstract in Dutch
In dit paper onderzoeken we het aandeel van verborgen werkloosheid (WW) in de
WAO-instroom. Op basis van longitudinale administratieve UWV-gegevens van werkgevers van
1994-2003 schatten we dit aandeel op gemiddeld 11% van de WAO-instroom. Dit komt overeen
met 2,6% van de ‘werkelijke’ WW-instroom. Kijken we naar het aandeel van de instroom over
de tijd, dan zien we een sterke daling van de verborgen werkloosheidscomponent, van 5,4% van
de WW-instroom in 1994 tot 0,7% in 2003. Daarnaast vinden we dat het grootste deel van de
correlatie tussen WW- en WAO-instroom in de UWV-gegevens is toe te rekenen aan
substitutie-effecten, en niet correlatie waar werkgevers geen invloed op hebben.
Steekwoorden: werkgeversgedrag (D21), sociale zekerheid (H55), arbeidsongeschiktheid (I12),
werkgelegenheid (J2)
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By now, there is a substantial body of empirical research that addresses the effects of social
insurance on labour supply (see Krueger and Meyer (2002) for a survey). This strand of research
seems of particular interest to Western European countries, where relatively generous social
security arrangements have caused substantial hidden unemployment. More recently, however,
such effects also have become more prevalent in the US. Autor and Duggan (2003) ﬁnd that, as a
result of DI program liberalisation in 1984, DI enrolmentrates have become two to three times
more responsive to labour demand shocks. For the Netherlands, the evidence suggests that – in
particular in the eighties – the inﬂow of (hidden) unemployed into the Dutch disability scheme
has caused the supply of labour to decrease substantially (Roodenburg and Wong Meeuw Hing
(1985), Aarts and De Jong (1992) and Van Vuren and Van Vuuren (2005)). In all of these
studies, the implicit assumption is that disability and unemployment risks may be related and
therefore hard to disentangle. When workers have become incapable to perform their current
tasks, determination of the degree of worker disability, as well as the responsibility of the
employer, may be a complex task. In these cases, the substitute pathway hypothesis is
particularly relevant: employers (and workers) might opt for the scheme which is most attractive.
Riphahn (1997) and Hassink et al. (1997) present empirical models where the maginitude of
substitution effects is addressed explicitly. Riphahn (1997) tests the hypothesis that variables
affecting the risk of early retirement affect the risk of disability retirement similarly. Rather than
testing the hypothesis that the inﬂow in schemes are full substitutes, Hassink et al. (1997) model
the extent of subtitution as a parameter that can be estimated. Identiﬁcation of this parameter
hinges upon exclusion restrictions – that is, variables that, when substitution is absent, are
supposed to affect the inﬂow in either DI or UI exclusively.
In this paper, we investigate empirically the extent to which DI and UI are used as substitute
pathways. For this purpose, we use administrative longitudinal employer data on the inﬂow into
DI and UI from 1993 to 2003. Similar to earlier work in this ﬁeld, the identiﬁcation of
substitution effects hinges upon the use of exclusion restrictions. Using these variables, we are
able to identify and estimate the ‘true’ underlying share of DI enrolment that can be typed as
hidden unemployment. This paper, however, extends and diversiﬁes the analysis in two aspects.
First, the panel setup of the data helps us to control for estimation biases that potentially affect
our substitution coefﬁcient estimates. In particular, we exploit the panel character by using the
method proposed by Wooldridge (2002) – that is, we include average values of variables in the
(Tobit) regressions of the UI and DI enrolment rates, so as to correct for potential estimation
biases. Second, in our analysis we distinguish between correlation that results from ‘true’
correlation that is exogenous to the ﬁrm, and correlation that results from substitution effects.
7Exogenous effects may arise if e.g. low productivity workers with both high UI and DI risks are
concentrated within particular ﬁrms. The neglect of such effects may cause substitution effects
estimates to be biased upwards.
Our estimation results suggest that substitution effects are the major determinant of the observed
correlation of UI and DI enrolment rates of ﬁrms. In terms of (expected) values, we estimate
11% of the observed DI enrolment rate in 1994-2003 to exist of hidden unemployment. When
estimating the model for separate years, we ﬁnd this a dramatic increase in this share, from 38%
in 1994 to about 3% of the inﬂow into the DI scheme in most recent years. From this, we
conclude that various policies have been effective in discouraging the inﬂow into DI from the UI
scheme. Our estimates are robust with respect to the choice of identifying restrictions that are
used in our model. More speciﬁcally, in the model the fraction of hidden unemployment in the
DI scheme is (over-)identiﬁed by restrictions imposed on the data. In particular, we use wage
distribution quartiles of workers employed at the ﬁrms in our sample, and sectoral business cylce
indicators as exclusion restrictions. We show that these restrictions yield comparable estimates
of the hidden unemployment in the DI enrolment rate.
81 Introduction
By now, there is a substantial body of empirical research that addresses the effects of social
insurance on labour supply (see Krueger and Meyer (2002) for a survey). This strand of research
seems of particular interest to Western European countries, where relatively generous social
security arrangements have caused substantial hidden unemployment. More recently, however,
such effects also have become more prevalent in the US. Autor and Duggan (2003) ﬁnd that, as a
result of DI program liberalisation in 1984, DI enrolmentrates have become two to three times
more responsive to labour demand shocks. For the Netherlands, the evidence suggests that – in
particular in the eighties – the inﬂow of (hidden) unemployed into the Dutch disability scheme
has caused the supply of labour to decrease substantially (Roodenburg and Wong Meeuw Hing
(1985), Aarts and De Jong (1992) and Van Vuren and Van Vuuren (2005)). In all of these
studies, the implicit assumption is that disability and unemployment risks may be related and
therefore hard to disentangle. When workers have become incapable to perform their current
tasks, determination of the degree of worker disability, as well as the responsibility of the
employer, may be a complex task. In these cases, the substitute pathway hypothesis is
particularly relevant: employers (and workers) might opt for the scheme which is most attractive.
So far, only few studies have addressed the interplay between DI and UI schemes explicitly. This
may be of particular interest for policy analyses, as changes in one scheme are likely to affect the
use of other schemes as well. Typically, in this literature multiple social insurance schemes are
modelled within the context of early retirement. In these models, the decision to retire consists
of a choice between various schemes – or, stated differently, substitute pathways into
unemployment. For instance, Kapteyn and De Vos (2002), Kerkhofs et al. (1999) and Heyma
(2004) show that the substitute pathways hypothesis cannot be rejected. That is, the inﬂow into
early retirement programs, disability insurance and unemployment insurance are driven by
relative beneﬁt conditions. Still, from this information alone it is hard to determine the absolute
size of substitution effects. Obviously, other factors – e.g. ﬁring costs of employers – may also
be important determinants of substitution effects.
Riphahn (1997) and Hassink et al. (1997) present empirical models where the maginitude of
substitution effects is addressed explicitly. Riphahn (1997) tests the hypothesis that variables
affecting the risk of early retirement affect the risk of disability retirement similarly. For some
characteristics, like age, wage and job characteristics, risk structures appear to be very similar.
However, the effects do not coincide with respect to the individual health and aggregate
employment measures – indicating that both schemes are not complete substitutes. Rather than
testing the hypothesis that the inﬂow in schemes are full substitutes, Hassink et al. (1997) model
the extent of subtitution as a parameter that can be estimated. Identiﬁcation of this parameter
9hinges upon exclusion restrictions – that is, variables that, when substitution is absent, are
supposed to affect the inﬂow in either DI or UI exclusively. With employer survey data, Hassink
et al. (1997) use variables like (lagged) quits and dismissals, as well as the training period per
ﬁrm as exclusion restrictions for the inﬂow into UI. In a similar vein, working conditions and the
number of workers on sick leave are assumed to affect the inﬂow into DI only. With this
information, they ﬁnd between 6 and 9% of the ‘desired’ dismissal rate to be directed to the DI
scheme.
In this paper, we investigate empirically the extent to which DI and UI are used as substitute
pathways. For this purpose, we use administrative longitudinal employer data on the inﬂow into
DI and UI from 1993 to 2003. Similar to earlier work in this ﬁeld, the identiﬁcation of
substitution effects hinges upon the use of exclusion restrictions. Using these variables, we are
able to identify and estimate the ‘true’ underlying share of DI enrolment that can be typed as
hidden unemployment. This paper, however, extends and diversiﬁes the analysis in two aspects.
First, the panel setup of the data helps us to control for estimation biases that potentially affect
our substitution coefﬁcient estimates. In particular, we may expect the inﬂow into DI to be
driven by the health conditon of employees at a particular ﬁrm. As health measures are
unobserved in our data, the estimated impact of various correlated variables – like age, education
level and income – are subject to severe omitted variable biases. Such biases are likely to affect
exclusion variable coefﬁcients as well, yielding improper estimates of the substitution effect.
Both Riphahn (1997) and Hassink et al. (1997) ignore the potential effects of omitted variable
bias. By contrast, we exploit the panel character of our data to circumvent this. Following
Wooldridge (2002), we include average values of variables in the (Tobit) regressions of the UI
and DI enrolment rates, so as to correct for potential estimation biases.
Second, in our analysis we distinguish between correlation that results from ‘true’ correlation
that is exogenous to the ﬁrm, and correlation that results from substitution effects. Exogenous
effects may arise if e.g. low productivity workers with both high UI and DI risks are
concentrated within particular ﬁrms. The neglect of such effects may cause substitution effects
estimates to be biased upwards.
Our estimation results suggest that substitution effects are the major determinant of the observed
correlation of UI and DI enrolment rates of ﬁrms. In terms of (expected) values, we estimate
11% of the observed DI enrolment rate in 1994-2003 to exist of hidden unemployment. When
estimating the model for separate years, we ﬁnd this share to have decreased dramatically, from
38% in 1994 to about 3% of the inﬂow into the DI scheme in most recent years. From this, we
conclude that various policies have been effective in discouraging the inﬂow into DI from the UI
scheme. Our estimates are robust with respect to the choice of identifying restrictions that are
10used in our model. More speciﬁcally, in the model the fraction of hidden unemployment in the
DI scheme is (over-)identiﬁed by restrictions imposed by the data. In particular, we use wage
distribution quartiles of workers employed at the ﬁrms in our sample, and sectoral business cylce
indicators as exclusion restrictions. We show that these restrictions yield comparable estimates
of the hidden unemployment in the DI enrolment rate.
The remainder of this paper starts by discussing the major characteristics of the Dutch DI and UI
system. Section 3 discusses the data. The model speciﬁcation and estimation results are
presented in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
11122 DI and UI in the Netherlands
2.1 The DI system
In the Netherlands, the provision of DI and UI is mandatory and ﬁnanced by pay-as-you-go
contribution rates. One of the key distinctive features of the Dutch DI scheme it that it covers all
workers against all income losses that result from injuries (‘loss of earnings capacity’). This,
combined with the public monopoly provision of DI, makes the disability determination system
rather susceptible to moral hazard problems. Moral hazard problems are further aggravated by
the generosity of the DI system, which is based on the individual earnings capacity. This means
that disability is measured as a percentage, rather than an all or nothing condition.
Over the years, the Dutch DI system has repeatedly been subject of public debate. Expressed as
a percentage of the insured population, DI enrolment peaked at 16% in the mid eighties, and
since then declined and stabilised at about 13%. There is strong evidence that the DI scheme has
been used as a substitute pathway into both unemployment and early retirement. Using medical
information of DI recipients in the eighties, Aarts and De Jong (1992) estimate a structural share
of hidden unemployment of 33 to 51%. Westerhout (1996) estimates this share to have been
equal to 50% in the period 1973-1992. Finally, using employer data for 1990, Hassink et al.
(1997) ﬁnd 6 to 9% of the ‘desired dismissals’ rate to be directed towards the DI scheme.
Various reform plans have been introduced to reduce the inﬂow into DI in the Netherlands. In
1996, the sickness beneﬁt program has been privatised, making employers fully responsible for
these costs. As from 1998, employer incentives have been further enhanced by the system of DI
experience rating. This means that, in principle, employers bear the costs of the ﬁrst ﬁve years of
DI beneﬁts.1 Finally, in 2002, the (potential) impact of incentives was further enhanced by a
more stringent system of gatekeeping and an extension of the sickness beneﬁt period from one to
two years. In order to be eligible for a medical DI assesment, both workers and employers have
to meet several conditions during the sickness beneﬁt period. 2 In sum, employer incentives to
reduce the inﬂow into sickness beneﬁts and the DI scheme have increased substantially,
particularly since 1998. In recent years, these incentives seem to have become effective in
reducing the DI enrolment rate (see e.g. Koning (2004)).
1 Using a dif-in-dif approach, Koning (2004) ﬁnds the effect of experience rating to amount to 16% of the DI enrolment rate.
2 As of 2006, a regime change of the Dutch DI system has taken place. The major ingredient of this plan will be the
distinction between a public DI scheme for fully and permanently disabled, and a mixed (public and private) DI scheme for
partially and temporarily disabled. Beneﬁt conditions for the partial disability program will become less generous.
132.2 The UI system
In contrast to the DI scheme, UI entitlement is restricted to workers who meet minimal work
history conditions. In particular, there are two criteria that determine eligibility, as well as the
entitlement period of UI. In order to become eligible to the UI scheme, workers must have
earned wages in at least 26 of the 39 past weeks. However, if the worker has not earned wages in
at least four out of the ﬁve most recent calendar years, the UI beneﬁt scheme is virtually
equivalent to the social assistance beneﬁts, and the entitlement period is 6 months. If the worker
meets the four-out-of-ﬁve condition, the scheme is wage-related and equals 70% of the wage in
the job previous to unemployment, where the entitlement period is a step function of the work
history. At present, the minimal entitlement period equals 6 months, whereas the maximum
entitlement period equals ﬁve years for workers. Together with the nonstatutory arrangements
made by social partners, this makes the UI scheme rather attractive as an exit route into early
retirement. In particular, some collective agreements supplement the UI scheme to 90% or 80%
of the previous wage earnings and extend the entitlement spell. Although the UI scheme may be
seen as a particularly attractive exit device for older workers, beneﬁt and entitlement conditions
have remained stable since 1987. 3
Similar to the UI beneﬁt conditions, the Dutch dismissal system has remained more or less
unchanged. Dismissals occur if labour contracts are dissolved unilaterally by a ﬁrm. Like most
European countries, in the Netherlands the employer must justify the dismissals. That is, the
worker either fails to perform his/her tasks, the relationship between worker and employer may
have become untenable, or jobs may have become redundant. The Dutch dismissal law is
governed by a ‘dual system’: employers either choose to request a Civil Court to dissolve a
regular employment contract, or they dismiss the worker by requesting prior permission from
local employment ofﬁces. The court procedure is less time consuming, and there is no risk that
the contract will not be dissolved – employers essentially buy off this risk in the form of
severance payments.4 Choosing the employment ofﬁce route is less costly for employers, at least
in the short run, but dismissals will not always be approved and judgements are binding.
Employment ofﬁces may do so if they suspect that both the employer and employee already have
come to an agreement to end the contract, and need approval by the employment ofﬁce for the
worker to become eligible for the UI scheme.
3 Recently, social partners have proposed to change the entitlement conditions for the UI scheme. This proposal entails a
lengthening of the entitlement period for workers with a relatively short work history, and shortening the entitlement period
for workers with relatively a long work history. Until now, the government has not implemented these plans.
4 In this case, the so called ‘ABC-formula’ is mostly used to determine the amount of severance pay. This means that the
reference pay increases with worker tenure, the current wage earnings and the extent to which the employer and worker
can be blamed for the dismissal.
14In practice, most large ﬁrms use the Civil Court to dissolve employment contracts, whereas
small ﬁrms mostly prefer the employment ofﬁce. In 2004, there were about 162,000 dismissal
requests by Dutch employers. Of these requests, 90,000 (56%) were directed towards the
employment offﬁces, and 72,000 (44%) to the Civil Court (SZW (2005)). In the same year,
82,000 dismissal requests have been settled by the employment ofﬁces. 84%, of these requests
were approved, 8% were not approved, and 8% of the requests were withdrawn. Moreover, 21%
of the dismissal requests (and 24% of the dismissal approvals) of the employment ofﬁces were
by reason of incapacity to continue their work. Some of these workers have entered the UI
scheme, others may have applied for, and subsequently entered the DI scheme.
15163 Data
For our analysis, we use administrative data from the Dutch UI and DI social beneﬁt
administration (UWV) for 1994-2003. For this period, we observe an unbalanced panel of
41,050 private employers in the industrial and services sector with more than 25 workers,
corresponding to 246,474 employer-year observations. Table 3.1 summarises the main
characteristics of this panel data set. For each employer, we observe the number of workers, the
sectoral code, as well as information on the composition of the workforce. In addition, we
observe the inﬂow of workers into the UI and DI scheme that can be assigned to them. For each
year, refreshment samples are drawn from new employers. As we can see from the distribution
of observations over the years, the effect of attrition dominates this effect, albeit slightly. On
average, we have 7.4 yearly observations per employer.
We deﬁne the DI and UI employer enrolment as the percentage of workers that directly enters
into the DI or UI scheme, and are contracted by this ﬁrm up to this moment. This results in
underreporting. For instance, a worker may ﬁrst receive UI beneﬁts, but subsequently be
admitted to the DI scheme. For short UI beneﬁt spells, this worker can still be assigned to an
employer, but now as an DI recipient. However, as we assume that the event of DI and UI
enrolment occurs at the moment of contract termination, we leave out these observations.
Similarly, we do not report workers with combined DI and UI beneﬁts, amounting to 0.17% of
the employee fractions of ﬁrms. Including these observations would lead to the overestimation
of substitution effects: as DI and UI enrolment rates are measured in terms fractions of workers
in ﬁrm observations, the correlation between both rates that results from combined beneﬁts
would be biased upwards, yielding an upward bias in the substitution effect as well.
Table 3.1 shows the yearly fraction of workers that enter into DI and UI schemes, averaged over
employers. As both UI and DI enrolment constitute only a small fraction of the workers, we do
not observe any enrolment in both schemes for 36% of the yearly employer observations. Also,
note that we observe positive rates for both schemes for 26% of the observations. Obviously,
ﬁrms with large employer size will be overrepresented in this group. In the table, we have
clustered sectors at the level of one digit, resulting in seven categories.5
5 In the UWV-data, sectors are measured at the level of two digits, resulting in about 70 sectors.
17Table 3.1 Sample statistics UWV-panel dataset, 1994-2003 (N=246,040)
Mean Std.dev. Minimum Maximum
DI enrolment 0.63% 1.4% 0% 92%
partial 0.24% 0.48% 0% 28%
full 0.39% 0.64% 0% 83%
UI enrolment = 0 ; DI enrolment = 0 0.36
UI enrolment = 0 ; DI enrolment > 0 0.091
UI enrolment > 0; DI enrolment = 0 0.34
UI and DI enrolment > 0 0.21
Workforce composition
Age 15-24 0.27 0.22 0 1
Age 25-34 0.32 0.14 0 0.96
Age 35-44 0.22 0.11 0 0.80
Age 45-54 0.10 0 0.88
Age 55-65 0.054 0 1
Female 0.30 0.23 0 1
First Quartile wage dist. (ln) 7.7 1.3 − 1.43 11.8
Third Quartile wage dist. (ln) 9.3 1.0 0.80 12.3
Firm size
<50 employees 0.51 0.50 0 1
51-100 employees 0.26 0.44 0 1
101-250 employees 0.15 0.35 0 1
251-1000 employees 0.060 0.24 0 1
>1000 employees 0.014 0.12 0 1
Sector
Industry 0.31 0.46 0 1
Harbour, ﬁshery 0.024 0.15 0 1
Transport 0.078 0.27 0 1
Horeca 0.13 0.33 0 1
Finance, insurance 0.028 0.16 0 1
Tertiary services 0.35 0.48 0 1
Temporary employment 0.047 0.21 0 1
Business cycle measure
Sectoral wage sum growth 0.12 0.48 − 1.5 2.2
Figure 3.2 shows the evolvement of UI and DI enrolment rates over time. During the period of
investigation, UI enrolment rates have gradually decreased, from 3.3% in 1994, to 2.0% in 2003.
In contrast, up to 1998 DI enrolment rates ﬁrst have increased, and then decreased substantially.
Thus, at ﬁrst sight, there is mixed evidence for the substitute pathway hypothesis: DI enrolment
rates have varied substantially, but this variation does not (fully) mimic the pattern of the UI
enrolment rates. We return to this issue when discussing the yearly parameter value estimates for
substitution between the schemes.






















19204 Model and empirical implementation
4.1 The model
The model we propose resembles that of Hassink et al. (1997). The basic idea underlying this
model is that ﬁrms have a desired dismissal rate and a ‘true’ disability rate. Both rates are
unobserved, as part of the ‘true’ disability rate is directed to the UI scheme. We classify this
approach as ‘semi-structural’ – that is, we uncover the size of substitution effects by imposing
(exclusion) restrictions, but we do not present a model that explains the determinants of these
substitution effects. We extend the model of Hassink et al. (1997) by allowing UI and DI risks to
be correlated – apart from correlation that results from substitution effects. We label this
correlation as ‘true’ correlation, or effects that are exogenous to the ﬁrm.
Our starting point is the following speciﬁcation in which a ﬁrm’s desired layoff rate f 0 and ‘true’
disability rate d0 are speciﬁed as linear functions of sets of variables x0, xf, and xd:



















where x0 is a vector of common covariates, xf is a vector of covariates affecting the layoff rate
but not the disability enrolment rate. The slope parameters of our model are organised in the
vectors β0f, βf, β0d.
In our model substitution effects are characterised by λ (λ ≥ 0). This variable represents the
fraction of desired layoffs that is directed to the disability scheme. Consequently, the DI
enrolment rate that can be classiﬁed as hidden unemployment equals λ f 0: 6
f = (1−λ)f 0 (4.2a)
d = d0+λ f 0 (4.2b)
6 An obvious extension of this speciﬁcation would be the inclusion of ‘reverse’ substitution effects – that is, disabled
employees ending up in the unemployment scheme. With the data at hand, however, we cannot identify such effects. In
Koning and Van Vuuren (2006), we however do extend the model in such a way, using variables that can be used to
identify reverse substitution effects as well.
21The combination of (4.1) and (4.2) yields
f = γ 0
0fx0+γ 0
f fxf +vf (4.3a)

















with the following parameter restrictions:
γ0f = (1−λ)β0f (4.4a)
γf f = (1−λ)βf (4.4b)
γ0d = β0d +λβ0f (4.4c)
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d and ρv represent the (observed) variances, as well as the correlation between, vf
and vd. For both ρfd and λ close to zero, the (observed) correlation coefﬁcient ρv can be
rewritten as a ﬁrst order Taylor series expansion: ρv ≈ ρfd +
σf
σd λ. This expression makes
apparent that the correlation coefﬁcient between vf and vd can be approximated by two
components. The ﬁrst one relates to the correlation between the error terms in the underlying
model (‘true’ effects), whereas the second corresponds with the substitution parameter λ.
4.2 Identiﬁcation and exclusion restrictions
In our model, the vector xf identiﬁes our key parameter of interest, λ. We therefore refer to these
variables as exclusion restrictions. More speciﬁcally, λ can be derived from the parameter





This expression makes apparent that only one exclusion restriction sufﬁces to identify λ. In the
UWV data, a number of variables can be used as exclusion restrictions. First, in the absense of
substitution effects, we may expect the employee wage distribution not to affect the inﬂow in the
DI scheme. More speciﬁcally, workers are insured against any loss of income that is due to the
risk of (partial) disability. Thus, in the absence of substitution effects, the absolute level of
wages does not affect the DI enrolment rate. 7 We therefore use wage quartiles as exclusion
7 Obviously, we may expect the wage distributions variables we use (i.e. ﬁrst and third quartile of the distribution) to be
22restrictions in our benchmark model. Second, the sectoral wage sum growth can be considered
as an indicator of the business cycle, only affecting the ‘true’ UI enrolment rate. We will use this
variable to check for the robustness of our results.
From the equations (4.4.e)-(4.4.g) we see that the number of (remaining) structural parameters
describing the variance and correlation between the UI and DI rates (σf, σd and ρfd) matches the
number of parameter estimates (τf, τd and ρfd). This however does not imply that our structural
parameters are identiﬁed for all possible combinations of observed parameter values. To clarify
this point, let us concentrate on the restriction described in equation (4.4.g), relating the
observed correlation coefﬁcient to the structural parameters of the model. In order to have
unique and tractable outcomes for this coefﬁcient, two conditions should be met. First, the
observed correlation coefﬁcient should be monotically and positively related to the ‘true’
correlation coefﬁcient ρfd for −1 ≤ ρfd ≤ 1. Second, the support of ρfv should map all possible
outcomes of ρv ( −1 ≤ ρv ≤ 1). Both conditions are satisﬁed iff
σd > λσf (4.6)
The intuition behind this condition is as follows. Suppose we observe high and positive
correlation between the DI and UI rates. Now, if substitution effects dominate the (observed)
variation in disability rates (λσf ≥ σd), the underlying ‘true’ correlation between DI and UI
rates can be either positive or negative. Obviously, one may think of positive ‘true’ correlation to
be most likely, with substitution effects that further increase the (observed) correlation.
However, as variation in the DI risk is dominated by UI risk variation, a priori ‘true’ negative
correlation may be washed out, thus reversing the sign of (obserevd) correlation.
4.3 Reduced form estimation
As the stuctural parameters in our model can be expressed in terms of reduced form coefﬁcients
(see equations (4.4)), our estimation strategy consists of a two step procedure: we estimate the
reduced form parameters (γ0f, γ0d, γfd, τf, τd and ρv) and then use these coefﬁcients to estimate
the structural parameters (β0f, β0d, βf, λ, σf, σd and ρfd) by Minimum Distance Estimation.
In the ﬁrst step, we use a Bivariate Tobit speciﬁcation for the reduced form model. As we have
argued in the previous section, many ﬁrms have no inﬂow into the UI and DI scheme, rendering
a Tobit version of equations (4.3) most appropriate. We extend this speciﬁcation by allowing for
endogenous (e.g. workers may be compensated for high employer speciﬁc DI risks by higher wages) but we correct for
this by employer speciﬁc effects.
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with i indicating the employer code, t as time indicator, and cf and cd. In the literature,
applications of Tobit models with ﬁxed effects are limited, particularly when applied to datasets
with large numbers of groups. Honoré (1992) proposes a method for which consistency does not
require any assumptions on the individual speciﬁc effects, basically by using transformations to
eliminate cf and cd. As a disadvantage, however, estimation of this model does not provide us
with the parameters needed for calculating marginal effects. Moreover, this approach does not
enable us to exploit information on the correlation structure of the UI and DI enrolment rates.
We therefore follow a random effects approach for which consistency does not require any
additional distributional assumptions, but does require a correct speciﬁcation of the correlation
between the individual speciﬁc effects and the explanatory variables. Thus, we follow
Wooldridge (2002) by assuming x0 and xf to be strictly exogenous conditional on cf and cd, i.e.
the employer speciﬁc effects. 8 This means we specify the employer speciﬁc effects as
cf,i = ψf +ξ0fx0,i +ξf fx f,i +afi (4.8a)















with xi denoting employer averaged variables over time, ψf and ψd as constants, and ξ the
vector describing the effect of these averages on the employer speciﬁc effect. Note that the total
variances of f and d are deﬁned as τ 2
f = τ 2
v f +τ 2
af and τ 2
d = τ 2
vd +τ 2
ad, respectively. The
correlation between the random effects (af and ad) is restricted to be equal to the correlation of
the residuals in equation (4.7). This means that we assume ‘true’ correlation between the random
effects of the enrolment rates, as well as between residuals of the enrolment rates to be identical.
Using equation (4.8) as an auxiliary regression for (4.7), our model is equivalent to a bivariate
random effects Tobit model, with x0 and x f as an additional set of of time-constant explanatory
variables. Including averages as controls for unobserved heterogeneity is intuitive: the effect of
changing x0 and xf is estimated, holding the time average constant. Thus, we solve the
unobserved heterogeneity problem and obtain unbiased estimates of γ0f, γf f, γ0d and γfd.
8 Kalwij (2003) builds upon the approach of Wooldridge (2002) by using a ﬁrst-differencing approach. This approach is
less sensitive to misspeciﬁcation of the parameterisation of correlated random effects.
24Wooldridge (2002) shows that it sufﬁces to estimate the model parameters by pooled estimation,
which facilitates the estimation procedure considerably. As a result, we estimate τf and τd, and
not the random effects and residual variance separately.
When estimating the bivariate random effects Tobit model, we increase the ﬂexibility of the error
structures of UI and DI enrolment rates in two aspects. First, in order to allow for serial
correlation we use a two-step-estimation approach: we ﬁrst obtain maximum likelihood
estimates of the model for each separate year, and then use Minimum Distance Estimation where
all parameter values are restricted to be constant over time (Wooldridge (2002). Second, we
allow for heteroscedasticity in the error terms by specifying τf and τd as functions of employer
size: τf = τf0Nη and τd = τd0Nη, where N is the employer size. Note that the parameter value
of η is restricted to be equal for both UI and the DI enrolment rate regressions, so as to obtain
constant relative values of τf and τd and ensuring ρv to be constant with respect to employer size
(equation 4.4.g).
4.4 Structural model estimation
We have argued that for the identiﬁcation of the structural model parameters – in particular in
order to obtain a (unique) value for ρfd (the ‘true’ correlation) – we need the condition (4.6) to
be satisﬁed. Thus, when estimating our structural parameter coefﬁcients by MDE, we impose
(4.6) as an maximization constraint, together with λ > 0. We deﬁne θ as the vector of the












The restrictions presented in equation (4.4) can be summarised by g(θ) = γ. MDE estimation of
θ now follows from minimising
Y(θ) = [ˆ γ −g(θ)] ˆ W−1[ˆ γ −g(θ)]0. (4.11)
The resulting parameter estimates ˆ θ are consistent and asymptotically normally distributed with
covariance matrix
ˆ C = [ ˆ G0 ˆ W−1ˆ G ]−1
where ˆ G = [
∂g(θ)
∂θ0 ]θ=ˆ θ.
When following the two-step-estimation procedure on the full sample, we assume the structural
parameter estimates to be constant in the time period under consideration. Basically, the
25parameter value of λ is then identiﬁed from the (time constant) reduced form coefﬁcients of the
exclusion restriction (i.e. the wage income quartiles), whereas the ‘true’ correlation (ρfd) is
identiﬁed from the reduced form correlation coefﬁcient (ρv). In principle, a similar estimation
procedure can be followed for separate years, which may be particularly informative from a
policy perpective. In order to obtain such results, we assume the coefﬁcient estimates of the
auxiliary regressions (equation 4.8) to be contant, while allowing all coefﬁcients in equations
(4.7) to be year-speciﬁc. When estimating the structural model coefﬁcients, we allow all
structural parameters to be year-speciﬁc as well, with ρfd (the ‘true’ correlation) as the only time
constant. In contrast to substitution effects, we argue that this correlation cannot be affected by
business cycle conditions, or policies affecting the relative attractiveness of the UI vis-à-vis the
DI scheme. As a result, variation in λ over time is not only identiﬁed from the (yearly)
parameter coeffcients of the exclusion restriction, but also from (the time variation in) the
correlation between UI and DI enrolment rates.
265 Estimation results
Table 5.1 presents the Maximum Likelihood estimation results of the reduced form bivariate
Tobit model, where parameters are restricted to constant over time. 9 The UI enrolment rate
decreases with respect to age, and increases with respect to ﬁrm size. Note however that we have
not included ﬁrm size averages in the regression (the variation of ﬁrm size within ﬁrms was too
small to allow for this), so that these ﬁrm size effects may be biased – that is, either the type of
workers at ﬁrms, or ﬁrm speciﬁc characteristisc may explain the employer size effect. When
looking at the calendar time effects, we ﬁnd the UI enrolment rate to have decreased
substantially. This can be explained by favourable labour market conditions during the period of
investigation, causing the unemployment rate to decrease from about 7% in 1993 to about 4% in
2003.
For the DI enrolment rate, we do not ﬁnd a clear, monotonic impact of the age composition of
ﬁrms. Similar to the UI scheme, DI enrolment rates are lower for ﬁrms with a high fraction of
women, and ﬁrms with low employer size. Furthermore, calendar time effects are an important
determinant of the DI enrolment rate. From 1994 to 1998, the DI enrolment rate has gradually
increased, and then dropped substantially. Potential explanations for this pattern may be the
introduction of experience rating in 1998, and stricter gatekeeping requirements in 2002.
Furthermore, the estimated correlation coefﬁcient of the UI and DI enrolment rate is equal to
0.12. The heteroscedasticity coefﬁcient η has the expected sign – that is, the size of variance in
enrolment rates decreases in employer size per ﬁrm.
Table 5.2 reports the structural parameter estimates that are obtained from MDE, based upon the
reduced form estimates obtained in the ﬁrst step (Table 5.1). We ﬁnd the estimate of ρfd –
representing the ‘true’ correlation – to be equal to 0.040. We estimate λ to be equal to 0.026,
implying that 2.6% of the desired dismissals is through enrolment into the DI scheme. This
estimate is substantially lower than Hassink et al. (1997) (6 to 9%). Recall from Section 4.1 that,
for λ and ρfd close to zero, the correlation that results from substitution effects can be
approximated by λ
σf
σd . This yields an estimate of 0.078, which is about two thirds of the
‘observed’ correlation (ρv) that is obtained from the reduced form model. The importance of
subsitution effects is also mirrored by the other parameter estimates, in particular of the
regression for the DI enrolment rate. In contrast to the reduced form estimates, we now ﬁnd
‘true’ DI enrolment rate to increase with age. Particularly young employers have high UI
enrolment rates, and therefore constitute an important fraction of the ‘hidden component’ in the
inﬂow into DI.
9 In order to obtain MLE of the bivariate Tobit model, we employed the QLIM code in SAS.
27Table 5.1 Estimation results for 1994-2003: Reduced Form Parameters of Bivariate Tobit Model for UI and DI
Enrolment
UI DI
Coefﬁcient St.error Coefﬁcient St.error
Constant − 0.065 0.0021 − 0.089 0.00087
Age 25-34 0.039 0.0039 0.0071 0.00015
Age 35-44 − 0.042 0.0043 0.0023 0.00016
Age 45-54 − 0.055 0.0055 0.0037 0.00020
Age >=55 − 0.11 0.0079 0.0053 0.00028
Female − 0.042 0.0040 0.00015 0.00015
26-50 employees 0.028 0.00049 0.0015 0.00020
51-100 employees 0.041 0.00050 0.0027 0.00021
101-250 employees 0.044 0.00054 0.0033 0.00022
>250 employees 0.052 0.00055 0.0037 0.00022
First Quartile ln(wage) 0.0039 0.00046 0.00093 0.00017
Third Quartile ln(wage) 0.020 0.00058 − 0.00024 0.00022
Year = 1995 0.0015 0.00067 0.0038 0.00025
Year = 1996 − 0.021 0.00072 0.0054 0.00027
Year = 1997 − 0.025 0.00071 0.0066 0.00026
Year = 1998 − 0.027 0.00073 0.0069 0.00027
Year = 1999 − 0.029 0.00075 0.0056 0.00027
Year = 2000 − 0.036 0.00079 0.0029 0.00029
Year = 2001 − 0.038 0.00081 0.0037 0.00029
Year = 2002 − 0.053 0.00090 − 0.00010 0.00033
Year = 2003 − 0.073 0.00092 − 0.0030 0.00032
Age 25-34, average 0.099 0.0020 − 0.0064 0.00076
Age 35-44, average 0.064 0.0026 0.014 0.00095
Age 45-54, average 0.040 0.0034 0.028 0.0012
Age >=55, average 0.0071 0.0052 0.010 0.0017
Female, average − 0.0027 0.00084 0.0046 0.00030
First Quartile ln(wage), average − 0.0061 0.00033 0.00039 0.00012




η − 0.66 0.0026
Basically, our estimate of λ for 1994-2003 is identiﬁed from the exclusion restrictions imposed
on the wage quartile coefﬁcients. The reduced form estimates for UI enrolment indicate that ﬁnd
high wage ﬁrms are more likely to dismiss workers. For DI enrolment, we ﬁnd the reduced form
coefﬁcients to be less pronounced – that is, only for the ﬁrst wage quartile, we ﬁnd the effect on
DI enrolment to be positive and signiﬁcant. This suggests that substitution effects are most
prevalent for low wage workers.
28Table 5.2 Minimum Distance Estimates for whole sample (1994-2003): structural parameters
UI DI
Coefﬁcient St.error Coefﬁcient St.error
Constant − 0.067 0.0021 − 0.088 0.00085
Age 25-34 0.040 0.0040 0.0082 0.0014
Age 35-44 − 0.043 0.0044 0.026 0.0015
Age 45-54 − 0.056 0.0056 0.041 0.0019
Age >=55 − 0.11 0.0081 0.058 0.0027
Female − 0.044 0.0041 0.0021 0.0014
26-50 employees 0.028 0.00050 0.015 0.00019
51-100 employees 0.042 0.00052 0.026 0.00020
101-250 employees 0.045 0.00055 0.032 0.00021
>250 employees 0.053 0.00056 0.036 0.00022
Age 25-34, average 0.10 0.0021 − 0.0090 0.00074
Age 35-44, average 0.066 0.0027 0.0012 0.00093
Age 45-54, average 0.041 0.0035 0.0026 0.0011
Age >=55, average 0.0073 0.0054 0.0010 0.0016
Female, average − 0.0028 0.00087 0.0047 0.00030
First Quartile ln(wage), average − 0.0062 0.00033 0.00013 0.00028
Third Quartile ln(wage), average 0.0071 0.00034 − 0.00011 0.00029
Year = 1995 0.0015 0.00069 0.00055 0.00012
Year = 1996 − 0.021 0.00074 0.0048 0.00013
Year = 1997 − 0.025 0.00073 0.0037 0.00024
Year = 1998 − 0.028 0.00075 0.0060 0.00024
Year = 1999 − 0.030 0.00077 0.0073 0.00025
Year = 2000 − 0.037 0.00081 0.0076 0.00025
Year = 2001 − 0.039 0.00083 0.0063 0.00026
Year = 2002 − 0.054 0.00093 0.0038 0.00027
Year = 2003 − 0.075 0.00095 0.0047 0.00027
Exclusion restrictions (xf )
First Quartile ln(wage) 0.0039 0.00048





Table 5.3 reports the key structural parameter estimates for DI enrolment into full and partial
disability, and years separately. For the yearly estimates, we re-estimated the reduced form as
well as the structural model for separately, while restricting the ‘true’ correlation coefﬁcient ρfd
and the average value parameters to be constant over time. 10 Note that the condition described
10 We also estimated the model for separate sectors. We ﬁnd hidden unemployment to be highest in the hotel and
catering industry (7% of the desired dismissal level). We also ﬁnd the fraction of desired dismissals directed to the DI
29in (4.6) is not binding for all of these subsets of the data – that is, the coefﬁcient estimate of λ
does not exceed the estimated value of
σd
σf , and we have unique values for our structural
parameters. For the inﬂow into the full DI scheme, the estimated fraction of hidden
unemployment is 15%. For the partial scheme, we ﬁnd similar effects (18%). Here, it should be
noted that the sum of parameter estimates of λ for partial and full disability enrolment rates
exceeds that of the parameter estimate for the joint DI enrolment rate. From this, we conclude
that the partial and full disability scheme act as substitute pathways: high inﬂow in the full
(partial) DI scheme is accompanied by low inﬂow in the partial (full) DI scheme.
Table 5.3 also makes apparent that the hidden component in DI enrolment has decreased
substantially over time. In 1994, almost 40% of the DI enrolment rate is estimated to consist of
hidden unemployment, whereas for 1999-2003 this percentage was only 2 to 4%. This decrease
can mainly be attributed to a lower proportion of layoffs that is directed to DI, and has further
been agravvitated by a lower (total) desired layoff rate. Our results suggest that various policies
aimed at discouraging substitution from UI to DI have indeed been effective. Particularly in the
time intervals 1994-1996, and 1998-1999, the hidden UI component in DI enrolment has
decreased substantially. In a way, these results are surprising, as DI enrolment rates in our
sample started to decrease not earlier than in 1998. We therefore conclude that, with constant
substitution rates, DI enrolments rate would have been substantially higher until 1999.
Moreover, decreases in the DI enrolment rates in more recent years cannot be explained by a
lower inﬂow of desired dismissals. Rather than subsitution between the schemes, it seems
preventative measures by employers have lowered the ‘true’ DI enrolment rate substantially. (see
e.g Koning (2004)).
An obvious way to check for the robustness of our estimation results is to use an alternative
exclusion restriction. For this purpose, we have re-estimated the model for 1996-2002, but now
using the yearly average wage sum growth per sector as an exclusion restriction.11 The second
column of Table 5.4 (‘Model (i)’) presents the resulting yearly estimates of λ. For all years, we
ﬁnd our results not to differ with respect to the benchmark model.
As a second robustness check, we tested our model against a more ﬂexible speciﬁcation for the
employer ﬁxed effects. In doing this, we followed Zabel (1992), who proposes to include higher
scheme (λ) to be relatively high for the ﬁnancial sector, but the number of dismissals is relatively low as well, resulting in a
low share of DI enrolment that can be classiﬁed as hidden unemployment. More generally, low sectoral UI enrolment rates
coincide with a high fraction of hidden unemployment.
11 Obviously, we also could have included this variable as an additional exclusion restriction in the ‘benchmark’ model. As
a disadvantage, however, we then lose two years of employer observations, as the sectoral business cycle variable is
obtained from two lagged observations of wage sums in our sample. Moreover, in contrast to previous years, sectoral
codes are not observed for about 30% of the employer observations in 2003.
30Table 5.3 Key parameter estimates and implied variable values for various subsamples of the data (standard
errors between parentheses)
λ σf σd ρfd
λE f
λE f+Ed
% Hidden UI in DI
Total 0.026 0.36 0.12 0.040 0.11
(0.00081) (0.0022) (0.00071) (0.015) (0.0035)
Full disability 0.021 0.36 0.11 0.045 0.15
(0.00084) (0.0023) (0.00073) (0.017) (0.0060)
Partial disability 0.016 0.32 0.090 0.036 0.18
(0.00086) (0.0021) (0.00064) (0.027) (0.0097)
1994 0.054 0.37 0.12 0.040 0.38
(0.0025) (0.0066) (0.0023) (0.015) (0.018)
1995 0.033 0.35 0.12 0.040 0.17
(0.0024) (0.0061) (0.0021) (0.015) (0.012)
1996 0.023 0.40 0.14 0.040 0.098
(0.0024) (0.0069) (0.0025) (0.015) (0.010)
1997 0.018 0.38 0.14 0.040 0.069
(0.0025) (0.0067) (0.0024) (0.015) (0.010)
1998 0.019 0.33 0.11 0.040 0.064
(0.0025) (0.0059) (0.0020) (0.015) (0.0084)
1999 0.010 0.32 0.11 0.040 0.035
(0.0026) (0.0064) (0.0020) (0.015) (0.0091)
2000 0.0069 0.39 0.11 0.040 0.034
(0.0024) (0.0082) (0.0023) (0.015) (0.012)
2001 0.0075 0.43 0.12 0.040 0.039
(0.0024) (0.0094) (0.0025) (0.015) (0.012)
2002 0.0058 0.44 0.11 0.040 0.041
(0.0023) (0.010) (0.0025) (0.015) (0.016)
2003 0.0067 0.35 0.10 0.040 0.023
(0.0026) (0.0088) (0.0025) (0.015) (0.0089)
order polynomials of the value averages in the auxiliary regression(s). The third column of Table
5.4 presents the estimates of λ that result from this approach. Generally, we ﬁnd the inclusion of
quadratic terms of our value averages (of age categories, gender and wage quartiles) to increase
the ﬁt of our (bivariate) reduced form model substantially, but this does not affect the size of the
coefﬁcients decribing the effect of our exlcusion restrictions. Consequently, our parameter
estimates of λ do not change signiﬁcantly as well.
31Table 5.4 Testing the robustness of λ vis-a-vis alternative speciﬁcations
Model (i): Model (ii): Model (iii)
‘Benchmark model’ Sectoral business cycle Flexible parameterisation
as exclusion restriction of employer ﬁxed effects
1994 0.054 – 0.049
(0.0025) (0.0025)
1995 0.033 – 0.028
(0.0024) (0.0025)
1996 0.023 0.027 0.020
(0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0026)
1997 0.018 0.021 0.015
(0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0026)
1998 0.019 0.020 0.014
(0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025)
1999 0.010 0.012 0.0053
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0024)
2000 0.0069 0.0083 0.0023
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0021)
2001 0.0075 0.0091 0.0032
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0021)
2002 0.0058 0.0052 0.0025
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.00019)
2003 0.0067 – 0.013*
(0.0026) (0.0021)
* Indicates a coefﬁcient estimate of λ that is signiﬁcantly different from Model (i) (P > .01).
326 Conclusions
In this paper, we construct and estimate a (semi-) structural model, so as to uncover the size of
hidden unemployment in the DI enrolment rate. For this purpose, we use longitudinal
administrative data for the Netherlands over the period 1994-2003. In principle, the estimation
procedure we propose can be applied to various types of data sets, ranging from survey data to
(large) administrative data. In the ﬁrst stage of the estimation, standard estimation techniques
can be used to obtain reduced form estimates. These estimates can then be used to obtain
Minimum Distance estimates of the structural parameters of our model. The estimates are
particularly informative on the potential size of policies that aim to diminish moral hazard
problems – for instance, the use of DI experience rating systems.
We ﬁnd the average fraction of hidden unemployment in DI enrolment in 1994-2003 to be equal
to about 11%. This corresponds to 2.6% of the ‘true’ UI enrolment rate of employers. We ﬁnd
this result to be robust to our choice of exclusion restrictions. More speciﬁcally, using wage
distribution quartiles on the one hand, and sectoral business cycle indicators on the other hand,
we obtain similar estimates for the size of substitution effects. Our estimates suggest that most
of the correlation that is observed between the UI and DI enrolment rates can be explained by
substitution effects, and not by (‘true’) correlation that is exogenous to the ﬁrm. For the period
of investigation, we ﬁnd the hidden component in DI enrolment to have decreased substantially,
from 38% in 1994 to 2-4% from 2000 onwards. This means that, with constant substitition
effects, DI enrolments rate would have been substantially higher until 1999. Moreover, the
decreases in the DI enrolment from 2000 and onwards cannot be explained by a lower inﬂow of
desired dismissals. Instead, it may well have been that preventative measures by employers, in
particular the experience rating plan that started in 1998, have lowered the DI enrolment rate
substantially.
The estimation method we propose in this paper offers interesting avenues for further research.
First, one way to extend the model is by also addressing substitution between DI enrolment and
(early) retirement schemes. Taking this into account – as suggested by Kerkhofs et al. (1999) –
would probably imply a higher share of false claimants of DI beneﬁts. Second, substitution
effects can also be modelled between the enrolment rate into the partial disability scheme and
into the full disability scheme. Our estimation results suggest the presence of such effects, but a
more explicit model is needed to determine its importance.
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